The Protection of Comptuer Programs in Japan by Harwell, Lee W., Jr.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1983
The Protection of Comptuer Programs in Japan
Lee W. Harwell Jr.
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee W. Harwell Jr., The Protection of Comptuer Programs in Japan, 6 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 105 (1983).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol6/iss1/5
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Protection of Computer Programs
in Japan
I. INTRODUCTION
To catch up with the industrialized world, Japan promoted rapid
growth in industry by using technology and know-how already existing
in other countries. Believing regulation would retard acquisition of
foreign technology, Japan avoided implementing any extensive reg-
ulatory scheme for protecting technology. I As a result, Japan has
become an industrial giant. Because Japan will continue to be a net
importer of technology in the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that
Japan will adopt any new regulatory scheme for controlling all
technology.
Computer programs present a unique problem for Japan. Despite
the absence of regulations protecting technology, fierce competition,
ease of duplication and expanding markets for software have made it
difficult for Japan to acquire foreign computer programs. However,
Japan is fast-becoming a net exporter of original computer pro-
grams. Thus, while Japanese companies still seek access to foreign
programs, they should be equally interested in preventing the unau-
thorized use, sale and distribution of their own programs. Therefore,
it is now in Japan's best interest to adopt and enforce a statutory form
of regulation to obtain both protection of, and access to, computer
software. 2
Part II of this comment demonstrates how the nature of the
computer software industry creates the need for a new form of software
protection in Japan.3 Part III examines Japan's existing forms of legal
I. "Japan does not have a statute dealing with know-how per se, a serious deficiency
for its protection in a Civil Law Country." Amemiya & Guttman, Know-How, in 4 DoING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.0214], at VI 1-5 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982) thereinafter cited as Know-
How]. In contrast, regulation of the actual influx of technology has been extensive. The
influx of technology has been carefully regulated in an effort to avoid domination by foreign
industries. Note, Japan and the Introduction of Foreign Technology: A Blueprint for Less
Developed Countries?, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 171, 173 (1982).
2. Whether the economic advantages of a statutory solution will sufficiently outweigh
the traditional Japanese reluctance to litigate is beyond the scope of this comment and,
therefore, will only be mentioned briefly.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-14.
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protection of software. 4 Part IV analyzes proposed regulations that
would protect domestic computer programs as well as provide access
to foreign computer programs. 5
II. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE
Three factors, endemic to the world-wide computer industry,
have increased the need for adequate computer software protection.
First, computer manufacturers are competing on the basis of their
software capability. Companies have shifted investment allocation
from hardware to software. 6 As a result of this increased investment
in software, its unauthorized use, sale and distribution represents a
greater loss of investment return than ever before. Second, the sale
of inexpensive computers, run by standardized software, has grown
exponentially. 7 This growth in market size should also exponentially
increase the incentive to use, sell and distribute software without
authorization. In addition, this explosive growth in the software mar-
ket and concurrent increase in the unauthorized use, sale and distri-
bution of software should cause a greater disparity between the po-
tential and actual revenue that accrues to the software manufacturer-
for every unauthorized sale, the manufacturer loses a potential cus-
tomer. Third, because the significant cost of producing a computer
program accrues while it is being written rather than while it is being
reproduced, the potential for industrial espionage has increased. Most
technologies require that the lion's share of investment be spent in
retooling manufacturing facilities, buying materials and labor.8 Once
a computer program is finished, it may be mass-produced for the
cost of the tape on which it is copied. The resulting heavy initial
4. See infra text accompanying notes 15-67.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-85.
6. Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software, prepared by the Inter-
national Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, 1978, reprinted
in 11 LAW & COMPUTER TECH. 2 (1978) (retitled as LAw/TECH.) [hereinafter cited as WIPO
Proposal].
7. Id.
8. A comparison of investments in hardware and software illustrates the difference in
investment between software and other technologies. "[S]oftware businesses . . . require
significantly less capital than hardware makers, which need considerable amounts of in-
vestment money to build manufacturing plants .... [A] software house needs only one-
third as much investment capital as a hardware company to reach the same dollar level of
sales." Software: New Territory for Venture Capitalists: Competing for Micro Computer
Software Companies, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1981, at 103.
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investment allocation during writing and nominal investment allo-
cation during mass production provides significant incentive for com-
peting manufacturers to allow another company to bear the cost of
development and then steal the finished program. Theft of existing
programs is not unusual, and Japan is a world center for such industrial
espionage. 9
Japan will continue to need a method of business that fosters
access to foreign programs. Allowing computer software companies
to rely on their own ability, rather than regulations, to protect them-
selves does not produce the advantages in foreign technology acqui-
sition that have been realized in other Japanese industries. The ease
with which computer programs may be copied and the expanding
markets for computer programs have caused both foreign and domestic
computer companies to be extremely hesitant to allow access to their
software.10 If regulations imposed on Japan's computer program in-
dustry adequately protected against the unauthorized use, sale and
distribution of software, foreign companies would be more willing to
license their programs to Japanese companies.
Software protection is necessary to foster development of the
computer software industry. While Japan will continue to be a net
importer of technology for some years to come, some Japanese com-
panies plan to become net exporters of software by 1991.11 To foster
this growth in domestic software development, Japanese companies
must be assured that they will reap the rewards of their efforts to
develop programs by assuring a profitable return on their invest-
ment. Thus, protection from the unauthorized use, sale and distri-
bution of software is necessary to provide incentive for software
manufacturers to develop computer programs. As a result, Japan's
traditional objective of making the acquisition of foreign technologies
9. Ten thousand commercial spies now operate in Japan. Espionage is an actively
sought skill. For example, the School of Industrial Protection opened in 1968 and organized
to train industrial spies and counter-spies. Students are generally young executives selected
by Japanese companies. I A. WISE, TRADE SECRETS AND KNow-How THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD: JAPAN § 1.0517], at 1-80-81 (Aug. 1981). The pervasive espionage in the Japanese
computer industry is exemplified by the recent F.B.I. "sting" operation against operatives
of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Hitachi Ltd., who acquired confidential computer
tapes from I.B.M. Now, From the FBI: Japanscam, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 44 [hereinafter
cited as Japanscam].
10. Gregory, Thorp & Bartholemew, Japan's "Third Revolution": A Far-Reaching
Restructuring Rivaling the Meiji and Postwar Eras, WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 1982, at
23. See also Attempting to Overcome the U.S. Lead in Software, Bus. WK., Dec. 14, 198 1,
at 74 [hereinafter cited as To Overcome the U.S. Lead].
11. To Overcome the U.S. Lead, supra note 10, at 77.
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as easy as possible is no longer its only objective for its computer
software industry. Japan's new objective for its software industry is
to assure adequate protection from foreign and domestic companies
seeking Japanese software.12
To foster development of its domestic software industry, Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is providing funds
for many small computer software companies. 13 These small, inde-
pendent software companies are a relatively new innovation in
Japan. They are experiencing rapid growth which is largely due to
the expansion of the home computer market. 14 However, unlike large
computer companies, these small companies cannot effectively rely
on their own abilities to prevent the unauthorized use, sale and dis-
tribution of their software. Therefore, the only alternative for small
companies is to rely on legal protection.
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL PROTECTION
Presently, Japan has two bodies of law available to protect com-
puter programs: copyright and trade secret. However, they are sel-
dom used. In Japan, business and legal disputes are resolved through
compromise and accommodation rather than through litiga-
tion.' 5 Filing a lawsuit is normally viewed as an inflexible and selfish
act.16 Indeed, law in Japan developed largely to passify Westerners
conducting business with Japan.17
A. Copyright Law
Copyright law developed to assure artists and writers that
they would receive an economic reward for their efforts. Japan
adopted Western copyright law long before computer programs
12. A Registration and Certification Type of System to Protect Computer Programs,
MITI BULL., June 5, 1972, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER LAW SERVICES ARTICLES § 9-4, art.
3, at 2 (R. Bigelow ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MITI Report].
13. To Overcome the U.S. Lead, supra note 10, at 75-76.
14. Id. at 77-78.
15. Stevens. Japanese Law and the Japanese Legal System: Perspectives for the
American Business Lawyer, 27 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1271-73 (1972).
16. Id. at 1272.
17. The eminent Japanese legal sociologist, Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima, stated
that "law in Japan is like an heirloom sword. Western law was first conceived of in Japan
as 'no more than an ... ornament or prestige symbol' to make Japan respectable in Western
eyes. It was taken out and shown to outsiders but never used or only rarely used in actual
combat." id. at 1271-72.
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existed. 18 While computer programs bear little resemblance to paint-
ings, novels or poetry, copyright law may provide protection for
computer programs because they qualify as literary works of a sci-
entific nature. 19 A copyright of a computer program instills both
economic and moral rights in the holder.20 The economic rights of
copyright include the exclusive right to reproduce, exhibit or publish
the program itself and/or its translation or adaption. 21 These economic
rights may be assigned in whole or in part.2 2 The moral rights of
copyright include the right to publicize the program and to prevent
another party from changing or altering the program.2 3
Certain drawbacks present in copyright law effectively limit its
utility for protecting computer programs. To copyright a computer
program it must be an original work24 and it must qualify as a creative
expression of thought. 25 While the MITI has stated that computer
programs may be copyrighted as "literary works of a scientific na-
ture, ' 26 there has been no attempt to establish clear criteria for the
required originality and creativity with respect to computer programs.
While the term of copyright protection is fifty years, 27 the mar-
ketable lifespan of a computer program is much less than fifty
years. 28 Program designers cannot use a discarded program to aid
18. "The first modern copyright legislation is the old Copyright Law (Chosakuku h6)
enacted in 1899." T. Doi, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 202 (1980). Japan
adopted a new copyright law in 1970. See Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted
in UNESCO, 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, JAPAN (1982) (as amended
to May 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited as LAWS AND TREATIES].
19. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 3.
20. Copyright Law of 1970 arts. 18-20 (moral rights) and arts. 21-28 (economic rights),
reprinted in 2 LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 18.
21. Id. arts. 21-28.
22. Id. art. 61. Cf. id. art. 59 (moral rights are inalienable).
23. Id. arts. 18-20.
24. Under Japanese copyright law, an eligible work must be an original literary or
artistic work of a Japanese national, or first published in Japan (which includes those works
first published abroad, provided that they are subsequently published in Japan within thirty
days). Copyright Law of 1970 art. 6(i)-(ii), reprinted in 2 LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note
18.
25. Id. art. 2(1)(i). See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
26. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 3.
27. Copyright Law of 1970 arts. 51-53, reprinted in 2 LAWS AND TREATIES, supra
note 18.
28. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 3.
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them in developing a newer or updated version. 29 This results in
unnecessarily duplicated effort.30
The copyright system provides a limited remedy for copyright
infringement. While the holder of a copyright has a cause of action
against anyone who steals or remanufactures the copyrighted pro-
gram,3' distributors of illegal copies of the program cannot be sued
unless the distributor is aware that the copies are products of a copy-
right infringement. 32 Under present copyright law, the creator or as-
signee of a computer program may seek injunctive relief 3 and/or
damages 34 against an "infringer." However, because use and dis-
tribution are not actionable offenses, 35 software companies are un-
derstandably reluctant to copyright newly-developed pro-
grams. Further, the software manufacturer has no cause of action to
prevent the use of such copies .36 Therefore, the available remedy
under copyright law fails to adequately protect computer program
manufacturers.
Japan's present copyright system also fails to inform the public
of what programs already exist. Copyright provides no system for
disseminating information about programs or their outlines to the
public 37 nor does it provide any index or catalogue system of existing
programs. 3 Thus, given the thousands of existing programs marketed
in Japan today, 39 developers run a substantial risk of creating programs
that have already been developed. 4°
B. Trade Secret and Know-How Protection
Though no case law exists, license agreements are generally used
as a guideline for software protection. In Japan, these license
29. Copyright Law of 1970 arts. 27-28, reprinted in 2 LAWS AND TREATIES, supra
note 18.
30. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 2.
3 1. Id. See also Japanscam, supra note 9, at 44 (Japanese businessmen were arrested
while attempting to procure a competitor's software).
32. Copyright Law of 1970 art. 113, reprinted in 2 LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note
18.
33. Id. art. 112.
34. Id. art. 114.
35. Id. art. 113.
36. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 3.
39. To Overcome the U.S. Lead, supra note 10, at 77-78.
40. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 2.
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agreements constitute trade secret and know-how protection, though
they bear little resemblance to United States trade secret protection. 41
Trade secret and know-how law differs from copyright law in
several respects. Trade secret and know-how law does not require
that a computer program be creative. 42 Furthermore, trade secret and
know-how law protects documentation describing the program as well
as the program itself.43 In addition, trade secrets and know-how may
be given to others by formal agreement only, otherwise, the pro-
prietary interest in the secret will be lost. 4 These agreements can be
made with licensees, distributors, engineering companies or
employees .45
Trade secret and know-how protection is severely limited. A
trade secret agreement can only be breached by a party that agreed
to keep the secret. 6 Third parties who acquire the secret have the
full right to use it.47 Moreover, any civil proceeding brought to protect
41. Trade secret protection in the United States has been based on various aggregates
of property law, unjust enrichment and contract law, although no uniform basis for trade
secret protection is followed by all states. For example, New Jersey defines a trade secret
as:
[T]he whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information,
design, process, procedure, formula or improvements which is secret and of value. A
trade secret shall be presumed secret when the owner thereof takes measures to
prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the
owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.
E. KINrNER & J. LAHR, AN IrEaLErTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 184 (2d ed. 1982). Japanese
and American trade secret law differs in that American trade secret law imposes liability
irrespective of a contractual or confidential relationship: "[olne who discloses or uses an-
other's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if: (a) he discovered
the '[trade] secret by improper means; or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him .... " RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 (1939); see generally KINTNER, supra note 41, at 209-20 (a discussion of
how the concepts of contract, property and unjust enrichment have been relied upon in
American cases).
42. Know-How, supra note 1, § 5.03[11], at VI 5-4.
43. Id. § 5.01, at VI 5-2.
44. Id. § 5.04, at VI 5-5.
45. id.
46. Id. § 5.06, at VI 5-9.
47. This aspect of Japan's limited trade protection was demonstrated in a case brought
by a German firm (Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft) against a Japanese company (Waukesha
ChOetsu Yogen Kaisha) which was formed as a joint venture between the American licensee
of the German firm (Waukesha Bearings Co.) and a Japanese firm (Chfietsu). Waukesha
Bearings Co. was licensed to manufacture and sell oil lubricated propeller shaft tube sealings
using German know-how. Without authorization, Waukesha established the joint venture
with Chfietsu which began using the German know-how. The German company sued for a
preliminary injunction against Waukesha Chtietsu. The injunction was denied because Wau-
kesha Chfietsu was considered a separate legal entity from Waukesha and not a party to the
agreement. Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v. Waukesha Chfietsu Yagen Kaisha, Sept.
5, 1966, High Ct., Tokyo, Japan, 17 Kakyti minshfi 769, summarized in Know-How, supra
note I, § 5.06, at VI 5-9-10. This is the only case which mentions the legal status of know-
how agreements between companies. T. Dot, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN
88 (1980).
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trade secrets and know-how will be open to the public. 48  Therefore,
bringing an action for breach of a trade secret agreement will destroy
the secret nature of the know-how.
49
Remedies which may be sought for breach of a trade secret or
know-how agreement include damages, specific performance and res-
cission.50  Damages are normally limited to remuneration for the nat-
ural and proximate consequences of the breach as well as any damages
which were reasonably foreseeable."
The most effective remedy for protecting computer programs,
specific performance of a non-disclosure clause, is seldom
used.5 2 Specific performance would prevent the unauthorized use,
48. "[T]he court procedures are in principle open to the public and the owner will
not want to disclose his know-how to the public. However, in order to win his case he must
disclose it." Lee & Kubota, Remedies for Breach of License Agreements, in PATENT AND
KNOw-How LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 265 (T. Doi & W. Shattuck eds.
1977).
49. The know-how may be kept secret if only a temporary injunction is
sought. However, because the method of proof is limited in this procedure, it is unlikely
that a court will grant a temporary injunction in matters concerning complicated techniques
which must be explained to the judge before he or she can understand the case. Id. at 265
n.218.
50. All three remedies may be sought simultaneously throughout a given case. Injunctive
relief may be achieved through an action for performance of the agreement. The Civil Code
provisions governing these remedies are articles 412-422 and 540-548. WISE, supra note
9, § 1.0614], at 1-95 n.8.
5I. No case exists in which damages were sought for breach of a trade secret or know-
how agreement. The closest analogy may be found in American Cyanamid Co. v. Nissan
Kagakuk6gy6 K.K., Sept. 7, 1970, Dist. Ct., Toyama, Japan 2 Mutaizaisan reishii 414,
which involved an attempted patent infringement action that was finally argued on a theory
of unjust enrichment because the statute of limitation precluded any action for violation of
the patent. The American company (American Cyanamid) had discovered that the Japanese
company (Nissan Kagakuk6gy6 K.K.) was using its patented process. The district court in
Japan found that Nissan had been unjustly enriched. American Cyanamid was awarded four
percent of the net sales price of the product for the applicable period of enrichment. In
contrast, under a typical licensing agreement for their patents in the United States during
the same period, American Cyanamid reaped five percent of the net sales price. The court's
rationale for awarding only four percent was that there were only two years left on the patent
when Nissan began infringement. Id., discussed in Dol, supra note 47. at 49-50; WISE,
supra note 9. § 1.05181, at 1-81-82. See also. WIsE, supra note 9, § 1.061411a], at 1-95-96
(article 416 of the Civil Code).
52. Article 414(l) of the Civil Code allows specific performance where appli-
cable. This remedy is extended to obligations to forebear from specified activities, such as
divulging the inner workings of a computer program. WISE. supra note 9, §- 1.06141, at
1-96.
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sale or distribution of a program, but there are no cases involving the
specific performance of an industrial trade secret agreement.5 3 This
probably is a result of the Japanese people's traditional reluctance to
sue.54 Furthermore, there is no contempt procedure available to en-
force compliance with a specific performance decree. 5 The plaintiff
is confined to seeking non-compliance damages.5 6 However, because
they are speculative in nature, these damages are unlikely to com-
pensate for loss of a trade secret. In addition, the most desirable
defendants, the buyer, distributor and manufacturer of the stolen pro-
gram, often cannot be sued. This is true for all trade secret reme-
dies.57 Therefore, the lack of case law may further demonstrate the
inadequacy of license agreement protection.
C. Legal Recourse Available to Foreign Companies
Since computers were first introduced, Japan has needed, and
will continue to need, access to foreign software. Both foreign and
Japanese companies need adequate protection from the unauthorized
use, sale and distribution of software. Such legal protection of soft-
ware would make foreign companies less hesitant to allow access to
53. The case most similar to one invoking specific performance of a trade secret and
know-how agreement is Yagen Kaisha Forseco Japan, Ltd. v. Okuno, Oct. 23, 1970, Dist.
Ct., Nara. Japan, 624 Hanrie Jih6 78. 3 Kokusaitorihiki HanreishO 550, discussed in Doi.
supra note 47, at 91-92. In this case the court granted a provisional injunction against former
employees. The employees (Okunu and Daimatsu) had signed an agreement with Yagen
Kaisha Forseco. Ltd.. a company in the chemical and metalworks industry. The agreement
prohibited disclosure of trade secrets and know-how gleaned from employment as well as
competition with Forseco for two years after leaving the company. Shortly after leaving
Forseco, Okunu and Daimatsu became directors of a newly-formed company (Apollo Chemical
Corp.) which competed directly with Forseco. The provisional injunction was granted be-
cause the scope of the industry dealt with in the agreement (chemical and metalworks) was
narrow, the non-competition limit was only two years and Okuno and Daimatsu had been
compensated through salary for keeping the trade secrets while working at Forseco. Whether
specific performance of trade secret and know-how agreements between companies will be
treated in the same manner remains an open question.
54. Stevens, supra note 15, at 1272.
55. WISE, supra note 9, § 1.06141, at 1-96-97.
56. This separate form of damages for non-compliance with a court order of specific
performance is similar to the astreinte in French law. It is a pecuniary action designed to
induce compliance with the order of specific performance. Id. § 1.06141, at 1-96-97.
57. The lack of remedy against a third party in breach of a trade secret and know-
how agreement was unequivocally demonstrated in Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v.
Waukesha Chfietsu Yfigen Kaisha, Sept. 5. 1966, High Ct., Tokyo, Japan. 17 Kakya minshO
769, summarized in Know-How. supra note I. § 5.06, at VI 5-9-10. See supra note 47 for
a discussion of this case.
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their programs. However, the question of whether existing law pro-
vides sufficient protection for foreign software is open to serious
debate.
Japanese copyright law is available to foreign companies if the
program is either published first in Japan or introduced in Japan within
thirty days of initial publication elsewhere. 58 However, as with
Japanese programs, the qualifications of originality and creativity are
still problematic.5 9 Alternatively, an existing copyright from a mem-
ber of either the Universal Copyright Convention6° or the Berne
Convention 6' is given an automatic copyright. Under the rules of
these conventions, the vague questions of originality and creativity
under the Japanese standards for qualification are avoided.
Japanese trade secret law protects a foreign company's software
only if an agreement exists 62 or is being negotiated with a Japanese
company. 63 As with Japanese firms, trade secret law allows no rem-
edy against a third party. 64 Thus, foreign companies which produce
programs solely for their domestic market cannot prevent a Japanese
firm from using and marketing copies of their programs. 65
58. Doi, supra note 47, at 205.
59. See id. at 204.
60. Both Japan and the United States are signatories to the Universal Copyright
Convention. See generally Matsui, Copyright, in 4 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 8.0212][c],
at VI-8-4-5 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982); Revised Universal Copyright Convention, Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). The only
requirement is that the work be first published in a member country or published by a national
of a member country. There is some question concerning whether a computer program
satisfies the requirement of "publication." Matsui, supra note 60, at VI-8-6, suggests a
work must be published in "print or other visual forms" to be subject to the Universal
Copyright Convention. The Universal Copyright Convention as revised in Paris on July 24,
1971, defines publication as "the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution
to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually per-
ceived." UNESCO, Records of the Conference of Revision of the Universal Copyright
Convention art. VI, at 33 (1973). For a list of member countries, see Abelman & Berkovitz,
International Copyright Law, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 619, 647-51 (1977).
61. For a list of member countries, see Abelman & Berkovitz, supra note 60, at
647-51.
62. Know-How, supra note 1, § 5.06, at V-15-9.
63. The Roman law doctrine of culpa in contrahendo is likely to be incorporated into
Japanese law. This doctrine invokes a confidential status to the relationship between ne-
gotiating parties. Disclosure of the other party's secret know-how to another would be a
breach of this confidential relationship. See WISE, supra note 9, § 1.06[511b], at 1-99.
64. Doi, supra note 47, at 88.
65. Absent a Japanese or American copyright, a third party is as immune from a
foreign plaintiff using Japanese law as is an indigenous plaintiff under trade secret and
know-how protection. The lack of recourse against a third party is demonstrated in the
Deutsche Werft case. See supra note 47 for a discussion of this case. In this case, a German
firm, under Japanese law, only had a cause of action against the American licensee. This
underscores the impotence of legal remedies where no direct licensor-licensee link between
the infringer and the party seeking redress exists.
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As long as a foreign company has a legal right to protect its
program under Japanese law, Japanese courts are avail-
able . 6 Generally, cases involving the protection of industrial secrets
have been brought by foreign companies. 67 To date, no foreign com-
pany has sought redress for the unauthorized sale or distribution of
its program. However, cases involving other types of industrial se-
crets suggest that foreign companies are free to bring an action to
protect their programs. The limited relief available to Japanese firms
would equally limit relief to a foreign plaintiff.
IV. LEGAL SYSTEMS PROVIDING BOTH PROTECTION AND
ACCESS
A. The Japanese Proposal
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has
determined that laws concerning software protection and access should
provide incentive for the creation of and investment in new soft-
ware. 68 The MITI has also determined that new legislation should
make programs known to the public so that software developers will
not needlessly recreate existing programs. 69
To prevent the "unauthorized duplication, use, transfer of pos-
session, lease, or use in the preparation of another program," 70 the
owner must have a right to injunctive relief and damages for such
activity. This would expand legal protection beyond both trade secret
law, which only allows legal action against a licensee, 71 and copyright
66. For example, the Treaty of Friendship between the United States and Japan ensures
that American citizens have access to Japan's courts. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, art. 11, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067, T.I.A.S. No.
2863. Regardless of whether a specific treaty exists, the common practice in Japan is to
allow suit to be brought by any foreign body. WISE, supra note 9, § 1.05112], at 1-86.
67. See supra notes 47, 60 and accompanying text. Yoigen Kaisha Forseco Japan,
Ltd. v. Okuno, Oct. 23, 1970, Dist. Ct., Nara, Japan, 624 Hanrie Jih6 78, 3 Kokusaitorihiki
HanreishOi 550, discussed in Doi, supra note 47, at 91-92, is the sole exception to this
proposition. Yfigen Kaisha Forseco Japan, Ltd. was formed as a joint venture between
Forseco International, Ltd. of Great Britain and Ito-chu, Ltd., as well as other compa-
nies. Doi, supra note 47, at 91.
68. MITI Report, supra note 12, at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See supra note 57.
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law, which precludes action against users and unknowing distributors
of protected programs.
72
The MITI has recommended that computer programs be regis-
tered with some government agency.73 To provide an overview of
existing programs, this agency would require the registrant to publish
the title and summary of the outline. 74 Such an overview would
prevent programmers from recreating already existing pro-
grams. 75 Rather, programmers could review registered programs and
develop more powerful software.
The MITI has suggested that laws specifically designed to protect
software should have no minimum creativity or originality
requirements 76 which would allow only certain programs to be pro-
tected and known to the public. Such requirements would diminish
the effectiveness of a law designed to stimulate software development
by avoiding duplicated effort and rewarding creators and investors. 77
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization
Proposal
Since the MITI proposal was issued, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) has developed its own proposal for
legal protection of software. 78 The WIPO proposal, which endorses
a copyright form of protection specially adapted to the needs of soft-
ware, 79 is designed to protect the manner in which the program is
72. MIT! Report, supra note 12, at 3.
73. Id. at 5-6.
74. Id.
75: Although the proposed registration/publication system would not alleviate the risk
of duplication of programs developed simultaneously by unknowing rival creators, the risk
of unknowing duplication of an existing program would be reduced.
76. "All the computer programs prepared by creators should be protected." MIT!
Report, supra note 12, at 5. Under present Japanese copyright law the work must contain
some minimum level of creative expression of the author's thoughts. For example, a form
designed for use as a bill of lading, failing to contain any expression of the author's thoughts,
could not be copyrighted. Kotani v. Japan Lines K.K., Aug. 31, 1965, Dist. Ct., Tokyo,
Japan, 16 Kaky5 minshO 1377, quoted in Doi. supra note 47, at 203-04. Some computer
programs can be seen as elaborate forms on which data is placed. so it is questionable whether
all computer programs can presently be copyrighted.
77. WIPO Proposal, supra note 6, at 5.
78. Id. at 11-24.
79. "However, ... the model provisions are essentially based on a copyright law
approach; the rights granted are consequently less extensive than those of a patentee: they
do not protect the concepts underlying computer software and cannot prevent a person from
independently creating the same computer software and using it." Id. at 7 (emphasis in
original).
[Vol. 6:105
Computer Programs in Japan
expressed rather than the concept underlying the program. 80
Both the WIPO and the MITI proposals enumerate the same
major objectives: the creator's efforts and the investor's assets should
be protected and publication of programs should be encour-
aged.8 Proprietary protection against the unauthorized use, dupli-
cation or distribution is recommended by both proposals. 82
While the MITI proposal suggests mandatory publication of soft-
ware, the WIPO proposal suggests that such publication be op-
tional.8 3 However, both recommendations serve the objective of in-
forming the public about existing programs to avoid duplication. 84 The
WIPO proposal also suggests that the lifespan of protection be
reduced. 85
V. CONCLUSION
The need for adequate legal protection of software is increasing
due to the changing nature of the world-wide computer indus-
try. Furthermore, significant changes, unique to the Japanese com-
puter industry, compel additional protection. Given Japan's expec-
tation of becoming a net exporter of new programs, and the vast
expansion of computer software markets, both large and small soft-
ware producers need protection for their programs.
Copyright and trade secret laws of Japan do not provide effective
protection for software. New legislation must be enacted to protect
creators and investors of software and to avoid duplicated ef-
fort. Japan's traditional reluctance to litigate may give way to prac-
tical necessity when small Japanese software companies are con-
fronted with the methods of market control and program acquisition
that major foreign and domestic corporations are capable of rendering.
Lee W. Harwell, Jr.
80. id.
81. Id. at 6; MITI Report, supra note 12, at 5.
82. WIPO Proposal, supra note 6, at 6; MIT! Report, supra note 12, at 5.
83. WIPO Proposal, supra note 6, at 9; MIT] Report, supra note 12, at 5.
84. WIPO Proposal, supra note 6. at 9; MITI Report, supra note 12, at 5.
85. The maximum duration is twenty-five years from the date of creation. If the
program is used or sold, the duration is limited to twenty years from that date. WIPO
Proposal, supra note 6, at 21.
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